最新版知乎爬虫登录分析
摘要:最新版知乎爬虫登录
(1)环境:nodejs,pycharm,chorme浏览器
(2)在chorm调试工具中打下关于"https://www.zhihu.com/api/v3/oauth/sign_in"的xhr断点
(3)按下登录按钮之后,在xhr断点处暂停,然后一步一步往前递推分析数据的加密位置
(4)如图是在56028处对form表单进行加密,追踪进去可以发现对表单数据进行加密的代码如下:
var b =function(e)
{
return _g._encrypt(encodeURIComponent(e))
};
生成_g._encrypt函数的代码如下:
"undefined" != typeof window && (new G).v("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");
由此必须在nodejs中伪造一个window对象:
"undefined" != typeof window
A是一个常量定义了知乎加密的版本号,这篇文章分析的为2.0,这个版本号会与"3_"拼接,生成"'x-zse-83': '3_2.0'"的header头。但是偶然发现如果采用"'x-zse-83': '3_1.1'",只要采用配套的加密算法,一样可以登录。
exports.ENCRYPT_VERSION = A
生成'x-zse-83'header头的代码如下:
完整的前端加密函数如下:
, function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {
"use strict";
function t(e) {
return (t = "function" == typeof Symbol && "symbol" == typeof Symbol.A ? function(e) {
return typeof e
}
: function(e) {
return e && "function" == typeof Symbol && e.constructor === Symbol && e !== Symbol.prototype ? "symbol" : typeof e
}
)(e)
}
Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
value: !0
});
var A = "2.0"
, __g = {};
function s() {}
function i(e) {
this.t = (2048 & e) >> 11,
this.s = (1536 & e) >> 9,
this.i = 511 & e,
this.h = 511 & e
}
function h(e) {
this.s = (3072 & e) >> 10,
this.h = 1023 & e
}
function a(e) {
this.a = (3072 & e) >> 10,
this.c = (768 & e) >> 8,
this.n = (192 & e) >> 6,
this.t = 63 & e
}
function c(e) {
this.s = e >> 10 & 3,
this.i = 1023 & e
}
function n() {}
function e(e) {
this.a = (3072 & e) >> 10,
this.c = (768 & e) >> 8,
this.n = (192 & e) >> 6,
this.t = 63 & e
}
function o(e) {
this.h = (4095 & e) >> 2,
this.t = 3 & e
}
function r(e) {
this.s = e >> 10 & 3,
this.i = e >> 2 & 255,
this.t = 3 & e
}
s.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.o = !1
}
,
i.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
e.r[this.s] = this.i;
break;
case 1:
e.r[this.s] = e.k[this.h]
}
}
,
h.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.k[this.h] = e.r[this.s]
}
,
a.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] + e.r[this.n];
break;
case 1:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] - e.r[this.n];
break;
case 2:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] * e.r[this.n];
break;
case 3:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] / e.r[this.n];
break;
case 4:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] % e.r[this.n];
break;
case 5:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] == e.r[this.n];
break;
case 6:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] >= e.r[this.n];
break;
case 7:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] || e.r[this.n];
break;
case 8:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] && e.r[this.n];
break;
case 9:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] !== e.r[this.n];
break;
case 10:
e.r[this.a] = t(e.r[this.c]);
break;
case 11:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c]in e.r[this.n];
break;
case 12:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] > e.r[this.n];
break;
case 13:
e.r[this.a] = -e.r[this.c];
break;
case 14:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] < e.r[this.n];
break;
case 15:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] & e.r[this.n];
break;
case 16:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] ^ e.r[this.n];
break;
case 17:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] << e.r[this.n];
break;
case 18:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] >>> e.r[this.n];
break;
case 19:
e.r[this.a] = e.r[this.c] | e.r[this.n];
break;
case 20:
e.r[this.a] = !e.r[this.c]
}
}
,
c.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.Q.push(e.C),
e.B.push(e.k),
e.C = e.r[this.s],
e.k = [];
for (var t = 0; t < this.i; t++)
e.k.unshift(e.f.pop());
e.g.push(e.f),
e.f = []
}
,
n.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.C = e.Q.pop(),
e.k = e.B.pop(),
e.f = e.g.pop()
}
,
e.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
e.u = e.r[this.a] >= e.r[this.c];
break;
case 1:
e.u = e.r[this.a] <= e.r[this.c];
break;
case 2:
e.u = e.r[this.a] > e.r[this.c];
break;
case 3:
e.u = e.r[this.a] < e.r[this.c];
break;
case 4:
e.u = e.r[this.a] == e.r[this.c];
break;
case 5:
e.u = e.r[this.a] != e.r[this.c];
break;
case 6:
e.u = e.r[this.a];
break;
case 7:
e.u = !e.r[this.a]
}
}
,
o.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
e.C = this.h;
break;
case 1:
e.u && (e.C = this.h);
break;
case 2:
e.u || (e.C = this.h);
break;
case 3:
e.C = this.h,
e.w = null
}
e.u = !1
}
,
r.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
for (var t = [], n = 0; n < this.i; n++)
t.unshift(e.f.pop());
e.r[3] = e.r[this.s](t[0], t[1]);
break;
case 1:
for (var r = e.f.pop(), i = [], o = 0; o < this.i; o++)
i.unshift(e.f.pop());
e.r[3] = e.r[this.s][r](i[0], i[1]);
break;
case 2:
for (var a = [], s = 0; s < this.i; s++)
a.unshift(e.f.pop());
e.r[3] = new e.r[this.s](a[0],a[1])
}
}
;
var k = function(e) {
for (var t = 66, n = [], r = 0; r < e.length; r++) {
var i = 24 ^ e.charCodeAt(r) ^ t;
n.push(String.fromCharCode(i)),
t = i
}
return n.join("")
};
function Q(e) {
this.t = (4095 & e) >> 10,
this.s = (1023 & e) >> 8,
this.i = 1023 & e,
this.h = 63 & e
}
function C(e) {
this.t = (4095 & e) >> 10,
this.a = (1023 & e) >> 8,
this.c = (255 & e) >> 6
}
function B(e) {
this.s = (3072 & e) >> 10,
this.h = 1023 & e
}
function f(e) {
this.h = 4095 & e
}
function g(e) {
this.s = (3072 & e) >> 10
}
function u(e) {
this.h = 4095 & e
}
function w(e) {
this.t = (3840 & e) >> 8,
this.s = (192 & e) >> 6,
this.i = 63 & e
}
function G() {
this.r = [0, 0, 0, 0],
this.C = 0,
this.Q = [],
this.k = [],
this.B = [],
this.f = [],
this.g = [],
this.u = !1,
this.G = [],
this.b = [],
this.o = !1,
this.w = null,
this.U = null,
this.F = [],
this.R = 0,
this.J = {
0: s,
1: i,
2: h,
3: a,
4: c,
5: n,
6: e,
7: o,
8: r,
9: Q,
10: C,
11: B,
12: f,
13: g,
14: u,
15: w
}
}
Q.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
e.f.push(e.r[this.s]);
break;
case 1:
e.f.push(this.i);
break;
case 2:
e.f.push(e.k[this.h]);
break;
case 3:
e.f.push(k(e.b[this.h]))
}
}
,
C.prototype.e = function(A) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
var t = A.f.pop();
A.r[this.a] = A.r[this.c][t];
break;
case 1:
var s = A.f.pop()
, i = A.f.pop();
A.r[this.c][s] = i;
break;
case 2:
var h = A.f.pop();
A.r[this.a] = eval(h)
}
}
,
B.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.r[this.s] = k(e.b[this.h])
}
,
f.prototype.e = function(e) {
e.w = this.h
}
,
g.prototype.e = function(e) {
throw e.r[this.s]
}
,
u.prototype.e = function(e) {
var t = this
, n = [0];
e.k.forEach(function(e) {
n.push(e)
});
var r = function(r) {
var i = new G;
return i.k = n,
i.k[0] = r,
i.v(e.G, t.h, e.b, e.F),
i.r[3]
};
r.toString = function() {
return "() { [native code] }"
}
,
e.r[3] = r
}
,
w.prototype.e = function(e) {
switch (this.t) {
case 0:
for (var t = {}, n = 0; n < this.i; n++) {
var r = e.f.pop();
t[e.f.pop()] = r
}
e.r[this.s] = t;
break;
case 1:
for (var i = [], o = 0; o < this.i; o++)
i.unshift(e.f.pop());
e.r[this.s] = i
}
}
,
G.prototype.D = function(e) {
for (var t = atob(e), n = t.charCodeAt(0) << 8 | t.charCodeAt(1), r = [], i = 2; i < n + 2; i += 2)
r.push(t.charCodeAt(i) << 8 | t.charCodeAt(i + 1));
this.G = r;
for (var o = [], a = n + 2; a < t.length; ) {
var s = t.charCodeAt(a) << 8 | t.charCodeAt(a + 1)
, c = t.slice(a + 2, a + 2 + s);
o.push(c),
a += s + 2
}
this.b = o
}
,
G.prototype.v = function(e, t, n) {
for (t = t || 0,
n = n || [],
this.C = t,
"string" == typeof e ? this.D(e) : (this.G = e,
this.b = n),
this.o = !0,
this.R = Date.now(); this.o; ) {
var r = this.G[this.C++];
if ("number" != typeof r)
break;
var i = Date.now();
if (500 < i - this.R)
return;
this.R = i;
try {
this.e(r)
} catch (e) {
this.U = e,
this.w && (this.C = this.w)
}
}
}
,
G.prototype.e = function(e) {
var t = (61440 & e) >> 12;
new this.J[t](e).e(this)
}
,
"undefined" != typeof window && (new G).v("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");
var b = function(e) {
return __g._encrypt(encodeURIComponent(e))
};
exports.ENCRYPT_VERSION = A,
exports.default = b
}
(5)在对form表单进行加密处进行debug,查看传入e参数,大概就是以下格式:
client_id=c3cef7c66a1843f8b3a9e6a1e3160e20&grant_type=password×tamp=1577724579349&source=com.zhihu.web&signature=e20eb854bbf41c784d857915a08d917aaa3e61a7&username=%2B666666&password=666666&captcha=&lang=en&utm_source=&ref_source=other_https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zhihu.com%2Fsignin%3Fnext%3D%252F
encodeURIComponent函数貌似是对e参数再进行一次url加密
"client_id%3Dc3cef7c66a1843f8b3a9e6a1e3160e20%26grant_type%3Dpassword%26timestamp%3D1577724579349%26source%3Dcom.zhihu.web%26signature%3De20eb854bbf41c784d857915a08d917aaa3e61a7%26username%3D%252B666666%26password%3D666666%26captcha%3D%26lang%3Den%26utm_source%3D%26ref_source%3Dother_https%253A%252F%252Fwww.zhihu.com%252Fsignin%253Fnext%253D%25252F"
整理一下,就是下面的:
captcha: ""
clientId: "c3cef7c66a1843f8b3a9e6a1e3160e20"
grantType: "password"
lang: "en"
password: "666666"
refSource: "other_https://www.zhihu.com/signin?next=%2F"
signature: "e20eb854bbf41c784d857915a08d917aaa3e61a7"
source: "com.zhihu.web"
timestamp: 1577724579349
username: "666666"
utmSource: ""
其中的captcha为验证码,clientId固定值,grantType为固定值,lang为验证码类型有"cn"和"en"两种类型,password为密码,refSource为固定值,signature需要计算,source为固定值,timestamp为时间戳,username电话号码。
(6)signature参数的计算
前端代码如下:
q = function(e, t) {
var n = Date.now()
, a = new z.a("SHA-1","TEXT");
return a.setHMACKey("d1b964811afb40118a12068ff74a12f4", "TEXT"),
a.update(e),
a.update(x),
a.update("com.zhihu.web"),
a.update(String(n)),
Object.assign({
clientId: x,
grantType: e,
timestamp: n,
source: "com.zhihu.web",
signature: a.getHMAC("HEX")
}, t)
}
this.update = function (e) {
var t, n, a, o = 0, u = s >>> 5;
for (e = (t = i(e, C, v)).binLen, n = t.value, t = e >>> 5, a = 0; a < t; a += u) o + s <= e && (r = c(n.slice(a, a + u), r), o += s);
A += o,
C = n.slice(o >>> 5),
v = e % s,
O = !0
}
this.update会把给定的字符串储存到变量C中,每update一次C的值就会增加。
举个例子:
a.update("password"); //C中的值就是["1885434739","2003792484"]
signature的值就是把clientId,grantType,timestamp,source拼接成字符串然后进行SHA-1加密,然后以十六进制形式输出。
(7)一些坑
一.貌似直接在nodejs中直接模拟window对象不行,必须要用jsdom虚拟一个window对象,不然form表单加密的值不一样。
二.nodejs中的toString()必须加toString("binary"),默认为toString("utf-8")
var t = new Buffer(e,"base64").toString("binary")
链接:
本作品采用 知识共享署名-相同方式共享 4.0 国际许可协议 进行许可。